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Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the view that the human mind need
not be in the human head. To speak more carefully, they defend the view




 of cognition can be spread out across brain,
body and certain aspects of the physical environment itself. Critics of this
view (which has become known as the ‘extended mind hypothesis’, hence-
forth EM) have pointed to the supposedly intrinsic nature of the contents
carried  by  inner  biological  vehicles.  External,  non-biological  vehicles,
such critics claim, are not (at least in any typical human case) similarly
endowed, and thus fail to exhibit one of the key ‘marks of the cognitive’
(Adams and Aizawa 2001: 48). I shall argue that this response is mistaken.
First, though I shall not dwell upon this, it is unclear that there is any
such thing as intrinsic content anyway. Second, in so far as the notion is
intelligible at all, there is no reason to believe that external, non-biological
structures are incapable of supporting such content. And third, even if
they were incapable of so doing, this would not actually compromise the
case for the extended mind. The worry about intrinsic content, I conclude,
is multiply fatally flawed. Despite all this, there are some related and
legitimate worries that may well be informing the unease expressed by




 The paper ends by briefly discussing these
worries, pointing to a possible solution, and then gesturing at the larger
picture of the extended mind and its place in nature.
The original argument for EM took the form of some thought experi-




It is important, in considering the issues to be discussed, to maintain a distinction
between vehicles and contents. Possessing a contentful mental state is most plausibly
a property of a whole active system (perhaps in some historical and/or environmental
context). Within that system, certain enduring material aspects may play a special
role in enabling the system to possess (whether occurently or dispositionally) a given
mental state. These material aspects are the vehicle of the content. The Extended
Mind hypothesis is really a hypothesis about extended vehicles, vehicles that may
be distributed across brain, body and world. We conflate vehicles and contents, as




Some related critical treatments include O’Brian 1998, Dartnall (in press) and
Weiskopf (submitted). For a somewhat different critical angle, see Sterelny (in Press).
 




responses to probable objections. One of the thought experiments (the
one that the critics typically choose to engage) depicts two agents, Inga
and Otto. Inga hears of an intriguing exhibition at MOMA (the Museum




 St., and sets
off. Otto suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s, and as a result he always
carries a thick notebook. When Otto learns useful new information, he
always writes it in the notebook. He hears of the exhibition at MOMA,
retrieves the address from his trusty notebook and sets off. Just like Inga,















even before consulting his notebook
 





 St. The functional poise of the stored information was, in each
case, sufficiently similar (we argued) to warrant similarity of treatment.
Otto’s long-term dispositional beliefs just weren’t all in his head.
Supposing you accept (and you might not: see below) the claim about
similarity of functional poise, then a very general principle might (we
suggested) explain your endorsement of Otto as dispositionally believing




 St. Let us
now call that principle ‘the Parity principle’. It went like this:
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a
process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no
hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part
of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process. (Clark
and Chalmers 1998: 8)
In other words, for the purposes of identifying the material vehicles of
cognitive processes, we should (normatively speaking) ignore the old
metabolic boundaries of skin and skull, and attend to the computational




 We did not
argue for this principle, except by providing illustrations and defences
against counter-arguments. In the end, it was meant to command rational
assent as a means of freeing ourselves from mere bio-chauvinistic
prejudices.
To make this case, we anticipated, and replied to, an extensive battery
of possible objections. I shall not rehearse these here, save to mention that
they cover the most obvious worries. Thus, to the worry that all that Otto
really believes before consulting the notebook is that the address might
perhaps be in the notebook, we reply that the notebook is consulted
automatically and accessed without conscious deliberation, just like Inga’s
biological recall. In this way, the notebook (like biological memory) func-




This may be seen as equivalent to a kind of ‘veil of metabolic ignorance’ device for
the identification of cognitive systems.
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1961) sense. To the worry that the notebook is fragile and impermanent,
we note that biological memory can be compromised by neural trauma
and (contrariwise) that Otto may be presumed to reflexively protect the
notebook from loss and harm much like a rather fragile biological limb
or organ. In response to the more general worry that there is, on our
account, just no stopping the leakage of mind into the world (and thus




s aplenty in the offering), we pointed to a
number of additional constraints, including those just mentioned (fluent
and automatic use, transparency in use, general availability as and when





information thus stored and retrieved. By these means we sought to erode
putatively significant differences from both sides, noting (for example)
that the biological is itself vulnerable to loss and intervention, and that
the non-biological may become fluently assimilated, typically trusted and
jealously protected.
The main argument thus takes the form of a challenge: show us why
the case of Otto and his notebook (thus elaborated) is not simply that of
an unusual realizer: an extended physical vehicle for a set of dispositional
beliefs very much like Inga’s own. Functionalists, as Dan Weiskopf (sub-
mitted) usefully points out, have long been open to unusual realizers for
mental states, including hybrid realizers that include e.g. silicon and bio-
logical parts. All that differs is that our hybrid criss-crosses the ordinary
boundaries between brain, body and environment.
Critics such as Adams and Aizawa take up the challenge. They grant
us the functionally-inspired Parity Principle, and the various difference-
eroding manoeuvres, and then try to block the conclusions downstream.
If their argument works, then the external structures (in the typical human
case) lack something so crucial that 
 
even were they to be located inside
the head
 
, they would not count as parts of the cognitive process. This is
the argument from intrinsic content, to which I now turn.
Adams and Aizawa label as ‘transcranialist’ a variety of positions
attributed to Clark and Chalmers (1998), Merlin Donald (1991),
Daniel Dennett (1996) and Ed Hutchins (1995). The transcranialist is
one who holds that ‘cognitive processes extend in the physical world
beyond the bounds of the brain and the body’ (Adams and Aizawa
2001: 43). But transcranialism, they retort, though it may describe
both ‘a logical and a nomological possibility’ is contingently false of
human cognition (43). The reason for this, they suggest, is that (as a
contingent matter of fact) it is only internal representations, as encoded
in neural media, that have intrinsic content. In all other cases (includ-
ing, especially, the inscriptions in Otto’s notebook) the symbols and
representations exhibit only derived content, and thus fail to display a
key ‘mark of the cognitive’.
 




The notion of intrinsic content is not, I think, one of the clearer and




 In so far
as the notion has any clear meaning, it seems to mean a state or process
that, in some larger context, carries a specific content or meaning in an
entirely non-conventional way. Thus the inscription ‘cat’ means CAT in
virtue of certain public conventions of use; whereas if some neural state
carries the content CAT, it presumably does so in some more direct
manner, that underpins, but does not itself depend upon, any history of
public use or social practice.
Adams and Aizawa insist that ‘whatever is responsible for non-derived
representations seems to find a place only in brains’ (63). I am not at all
sure this is true. It seems possible (for example) to ascribe representational
contents, in ways that are not obviously conventional or derivative, to the
states and processes of artificially evolved creatures (see Pfeifer and Scheier
1999: ch. 8). Or, if simple artificial creatures do not move you, take any
inner neural structure deemed (by whatever non-question-begging criteria
Adams and Aizawa choose) to be the vehicle of some intrinsic content X.
Can we not imagine replacing part or all of that structure with a func-
tionally equivalent silicon part? (As a matter of fact, this kind of replace-
ment has already been done, albeit only with one artificial neuron that
functions successfully within a group of 14 biological neurons in a
Californian spiny lobster – see Szucs et al. 2000). Unless we question-
beggingly assert that only neural stuff can be the bearer of intrinsic
content, then surely we should allow that the siliconized vehicle, or at
least the hybrid circuit that now includes it, is as capable of supporting
intrinsic content as was its biological predecessor? For these kinds of
reason, I do not believe that there is any non-question-begging notion of
intrinsic content that picks out all and only the neural in any clear and
useful fashion. My own view, in fact, is that the very notion of intrinsic
content is essentially fuzzy and indistinct, and that (to put it bluntly)
content is as content does (see Prinz and Clark 2004).
But since Adams and Aizawa stress that they are defending only a
contingent, humans-as-currently-constituted, form of cognitive intracrani-
alism, I suspect that they will concede this general point without much
argument. The real force of Adams and Aizawa’s worry does not lie in
any simple (and surely naive) identification of the neural and the cognitive.




It is related, I suppose, to Searle’s (1980, 1990) notion of intrinsic intentionality.
But whereas that notion seems designed to apply to (the putative mental states of)
whole systems rather than their parts, ‘intrinsic content’ (as Adams and Aizawa use
the term) needs to be able to apply to specific sub-states or processes, identifying
them as the bearers or vehicles (in systemic context) of genuine (not ersatz or
derived) meaning.
 
anal_514-532.fm  Page 4  Wednesday, November 17, 2004  5:41 PM
 
intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind 5
 
the hybrid neural and silicon-based activity that now underlies control of
the oscillatory rhythms in the stomatogastric ganglion in the Californian
lobster) are out-and-out conventional. They are passive representations
(more on this later) that are parasitic, for their meaning, on public prac-
tices of coordinated use. It is at this point that I think the Parity Principle
can be pressed once more into service. Consider, for example, an episode
of in-the-head problem solving during which I imagine the partially over-
lapping circles of a certain Venn diagram. Surely the set-theoretic meaning
of this overlap is a matter of convention? Yet the images figure centrally
in what is surely a cognitive process in good standing. The critics’ retort
will be quick. ‘That shows nothing’, they will say, ‘because the image,
when understood, must be understood only in virtue of its association
with neural goings-on that enjoy the essential luxury of intrinsic about-
ness’. But this won’t yet do, as when Otto’s notebook is accessed and
deployed, neural goings-on with associated intrinsic contents are likewise
triggered. Now the temporal dynamics loom large. For our claim, recall,
concerned precisely that time before the notebook is accessed and
deployed. So the correct question is: ‘What about while the inscription,




 St.” is simply dormant in the notebook. Inga’s stored
and dispositional beliefs have intrinsic contents too, not just her occurrent
ones. Surely that, at least, is not true of Otto.’
This is indeed a harder question. But suppose (and this is just the Parity
principle at work again) we encountered Martians whose biological mem-
ory allowed them to store, on demand, bit-mapped images of important
chunks of text. What is stored is thus a passive and conventional internal




When necessary, they can later access these images, thus perfectly recalling
these chunks of data. Surely, in that case, we would have no hesitation in
counting these goings-on as part and parcel of Martian cognition. But in
that case, it is surely only skin-and-skull based prejudice that stops us
extending the same courtesy to Otto.
One way to understand this proposal is as insisting that all that matters,
for some conventional encoding to count as the vehicle of a dispositional
belief, is that it be appropriately linked, at run-time, to representations
whose content is (as Adams and Aizawa insist) intrinsic. Such linking can
be achieved for conventionally formatted representations both inside and
outside the head. This defence of Otto is the strongest, since it gives away
the most to the critics. Indeed, in a rather telling aside towards the end




For an interesting account of the complexities that can arise when thus dealing with
encodings of encodings, see Haugeland 1998.
 




Having argued that, in general, there must be non-derived content in
cognitive processes, it must be admitted that it is unclear to what
extent every cognitive state of each cognitive process must involve
non-derived content. (Adams and Aizawa 2001: 50)
But this concession, I submit, removes the entire force of the appeal to
intrinsic content as a reason for rejecting EM. For it was no part of EM
to claim that one could build an entire cognizer out of Otto-style
notebooks!
This, however, immediately suggests a further issue, and one that many
critics have seen as the fatal flaw in the original argument. This is the issue
of (what I shall dub) active dispositional memory. This worry has been
raised in various forms by O’Brian (1998), Dartnall (in press), and
Weiskopf (submitted). Central to all these treatments is the observation
that biological memory is not a passive encoder so much as a constantly
active system that is both integrative and reconstructive. Thus, to borrow





 St. and who later learns that the museum has been torn down to




St. The earlier belief is unconsciously and automatically revised with the
receipt of the new information. Moreover, there is what Weiskopf calls
‘active propagation’, such that other related beliefs are similarly revised




St. and so on). All this, it is claimed, forms part of the normal functional
role of belief. Since the inscriptions in Otto’s notebook are not thus subject
to automatic, actively propagated, revision, they should not count as the
vehicles even of dispositional believings. They are excluded on grounds
both of functional dissimilarity (as above) and because the dissimilarity
matters, in so far as the lack of automatic integration would otherwise be
a source of unacceptable degrees of inconsistency and irrationality, of the
kind we would not want to ascribe to a proper cognitive agent.
In response to this (proper and intuitively quite compelling) worry, I ask
the reader to consider the following possibility. Suppose it were discovered,
by some arcane mixture of experimental design and non-invasive neuro-
imaging, that integration and update always occurred not at the moment
new information is received but later, at the moment the outdated or oth-
erwise affected information would have been called upon by some process
of recall or action-selection? Behaviourally, this system would look just like
us. Should we say that it nevertheless fails to be a true believer, just because
it uses a routine more akin (in computer science terms) to compilation than
interpretation? I see no reason to do so. The system is surely every bit as
rational as we are, it simply deploys its resources in a somewhat different
temporal sequence. It is rather like the old case of Dennett’s in which he
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imagines that we discover that left-handers’ neural organization is in some
ways quite unlike that of right handers. In each case, the imagined dis-
covery seems to locate a difference only at a level below that to which the
philosophical functionalist should attend.
This is, of course, broadly speaking how it is with Otto. If he has entered
two inconsistent inscriptions, one dated after the first and stating that
MOMA is no more, he will locate and select the new information, and
perhaps delete the old, at run-time. One difference, however, remains, and
that concerns the extent of this flow of run-time revision. It still seems
quite restricted and local in nature. It is by no means clear, however, that




 the beliefs that are,
logically speaking, affected by the receipt of some new piece of informa-
tion. I do concede, however, that the notebook’s lack of inbuilt links and
pathways makes it unlike biological memory in this regard. This brings
me to the final point I want to make in defence of Otto.
It was never our claim that Otto is behaviourally indistinguishable from
Inga. Trivially, Otto’s actions involve a whole lot of notebook-manipulation
that Inga’s do not. And there may well be deeper and more significant dif-
ferences too, as we have just seen. The claim is rather that 
 
taken as a single,
integrated system, Otto-and-the-notebook exhibit enough of the central
features and dynamics of a normal agent having (amongst others) the dis-




 St. to warrant treating him as such
 
.
I beg the reader’s forgiveness for deploying one last imaginary case to
underline this point. Suppose that it had turned out (as it surely might
have) that in a few restricted domains biological memory were not recon-
structive, and that, in these cases, what was retrieved was always what
was originally laid down. Imagine, for example, that our memory for faces
(only) was like this, so that I never merged two faces or made errors of
recall due to subsequent learning. This is meant to be somewhat analogous
to Otto, whose long-term notebook traces are indeed unusually static. In
this counterfactual world, should we say that these passive aspects of
memory cannot count as partial determinants of some of the agent’s





)? I see no reason, given the role that belief ascription plays in our
usual form of life, to be so restrictive. But if an inner mechanism with this
functionality would intuitively count as cognitive, then (skin-based prej-
udices aside) why not an external one? Our central claim was that many
of the reasons why we might initially reject such a possibility out of hand
are in fact very bad reasons, knee-jerk reactions that simply express our
strong prejudices in favour of biology over technology, rather than justi-
fying them in any way. The Parity Principle attempts to make this concrete
by asking us to consider how we would react were all the same functions
performed by on-board biological apparatus. There is thus a bigger picture
 




here than the critics’ intensive focus on the (admittedly) strange case of
Otto and the notebook might suggest. It concerns the nature of persons,
and the relations between biological and (as I shall say) constructive
notions of agency and constitution. I would like to end, then, by very
briefly (and inadequately) considering this larger picture.
Terry Dartnall, in a recent discussion of EM, comments that ‘If I dig a
hole in my garden with a spade ... my-spade-and-I do not get the prize for
“best hole in the garden”. I get the prize, even though I could not have
done the digging without the spade’ (Dartnall (in press)). For Dartnall,
then, it is always an agent using a tool, not an extended agent. This seems
very sensible and compelling, until we (ouch) dig deeper concerning the
role of the biological arm. Is it really just a tool too? Is his whole body
just a tool for the overseeing mind? Are some areas of the brain likewise





 In the case of the arm versus the spade, it seems right to notice
that both the functional and the phenomenological lines between a well-
fitted constantly available tool (more like a prosthesis, or Otto’s notebook,
than a patchily available spade) and a biological limb must be fuzzy at
best. There is also suggestive neuroscientific evidence to support the claim
that a tool, even when temporarily in use, is rapidly assimilated into the
brain’s body maps and is treated (temporarily) just like a somewhat less
sensitive part of the body. When a macaque used a rake for just 30
seconds, visual receptive fields became elongated as if the rake were part
of the arm, with the monkey’s fingers extended along the tines of the rake
(this work is reported in Iriki et al. 1996).
Indeed, the functional integration of a typical tool in use goes further
still. Berti and Frassinetti (2000) note that ‘The brain makes a distinction
between “far space” (the space beyond reaching distance) and “near
space” (the space within reaching distance)’ and that ‘... simply holding a
stick causes a remapping of far space to near space. In effect the brain, at
least for some purposes, treats the stick as though it were a part of the
body.’ Were we to move away from the domain of temporary garden
equipment and into that of serious, permanent or semi-permanent assistive
technologies (prosthetic arms, thought-controlled wheelchairs and the
like), the quip concerning the prize for digging would seem less innocent.
Lying beneath these merely suggestive snippets concerning tool use and
neural maps is, I believe, an important scientific fact about the biological





. To deal fluently with bodily change and growth, they have developed




Many readers will recognize the deeply Dennetian themes hereabouts. For more on
all this, see Dennett 1984, 1991, 2003; Clark 2002, 2003.
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resources are readily available and under direct control. Neural plasticity,
exaggerated in our own species, makes it possible for new equipment to
be factored deep into both our cognitive and physical problem-solving
routines. Just as we can recruit a well-fitted prosthetic arm into the mix
for digging the garden, so we can recruit a well-fitted external memory




 or (following the spiny lobster)
a well-fitted silicon substitute (on- or off-board) for an impaired or com-
promised neural resource.
One way to think about this is to depict the biological brain as a master
of what I shall dub ‘ecological control’. Ecological control is the kind of
conscious control that does not micro-manage every detail, but rather
allows substantial devolvement of power and (functional) responsibility.
It allows dedicated, non-conscious, ‘neural servo-mechanisms’ deal with
the fine details of reach and grasp (Milner and Goodale 1998, Clark
2001). It allows much of our skill at walking to reside in the elastic
properties of muscles and tendons (Thelen and Smith 1994). And it allows
(I claim) much of our prowess at thought and reason to depend upon the
robust and reliable operation, in dense brain-involving loops, of a variety
of non-biological epistemic devices (such as pen, paper and sketchbooks
– see Clark 2001: 8). Ecological control systems (of which genes are yet
another example – see Clark and Wheeler 1999) are essentially opportu-
nistic and exploitative. They take whatever is around, and build it into
problem-solving routines, exhibiting a management style delicately poised




 As Wayne Christensen (in
press: 22) rather nicely puts it, ‘The high level of regulated plasticity in
the brain helps explain how it is so easy to incorporate environmental
organization into our cognitive practices.’
We are good at this. It is our biological nature (as I argue at length in
Clark 2003) to be open to many forms of physical and cognitive hybrid-
ization. Some of these (I claim) may be so intimate as to effectively extend
the thinking agent. All of them are crucial parts of the nested, iterated and
ongoing process of cognitive self-re-creation that is the characteristic mark
of human intelligence. It is important that we develop an understanding
of ourselves (both scientific and philosophical) that is adequate to this




An MIT based team (led by Alex Pentland) have, for example, developed so-called
‘memory glasses’ that can recognize a face and then flash an associated name in




 of a second) that is too fast for
conscious intrusion. Nonetheless, the unconscious cueing improves memory of
mildly Alzheimic patients by about 50%. (Thanks to David Chalmers for drawing




For an attempt to view certain modern business management strategies in essentially
these terms, see Clark 1999b.
 








and recognizing the very large extent to which the commonplace identifi-





 termed a ‘forensic matter’: a matter of legal and moral
convenience more than metaphysics, and a convenience, moreover, that
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A better bet, I think, is to identify persons with what Rovane (1998) calls a ‘rational
point of view’. Starting there makes it plain that metabolic boundaries are not the
issue, and clears the way for more measured reflections that take account of func-
tional role, (loose) integration and (sufficient) coherence. The picture I favour is thus
a combination of (a kind of) interpetationism (Dennett 1996) and a weakened
version of rational systems theory (Rovane 1998). For some very preliminary forays




Locke himself was, of course, a prime opponent of the identification of the person
(the ‘forensic item’) with the biological animal. Like Locke, I believe that our legal




Thanks to David Chalmers, Dan Weiskopf, and Rob Wilson for some useful
exchanges concerning early drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Mike Ridge,
Matthew Nudds, Thomas Johansen, Richard Holton and Rae Langton for useful
comments on a presentation based on some of this material.
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